711 Discussion
Questions for
III. Are Policy
Attitudes Driven by Racial Attitudes in the
1.
To what extent can the theoretical and empirical frameworks
employed by the authors of this week’s readings be extended to study attitudes
toward other groups, like gays, women, Asians, Christian fundamentalists, Arab
Muslims, and so on? To what degree is a criticism of public opinion research,
in general—that studies focus mainly on attitudes, not behavior—also hold true
of these studies?
2.
A question to ask at the end of our discussion: Do you feel
more or less enlightened after reading these two books about the same topic,
but authored by individuals with “subtly?” opposing views?
3.
Here are a few questions about methods: Can we ever hope to uncover public opinion on
something as complex, conflictual and controversial as race, when many times we
don’t know how we ourselves feel? What
are the strengths and weaknesses of survey experiments like those employed in
Kinder and Sanders (K&S) and Sniderman and Carmines (S&C) compared to
traditional survey methods and experimental designs? Are survey experiments the
best of all worlds or are they limited in many respects? PS: remind me to talk
about unobtrusive methods of measuring racial prejudice, a la Kuklinski and
others (e.g., “Racial Attitudes and the New South."),
as well as implicit racial bias (Implicit Association Test (IAT), see https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/
.
Kinder
and Sanders:
4.
Although K&S argue that “no single sovereign theory will
do,” they find that racial resentment (a proxy for racial prejudice) plays a much
greater role in shaping policy attitudes that self- or group-interests and principles,
at least in their empirical analyses. Do all perspectives compete in the
empirical analysis on a level playing field, in your view, or are some
perspectives somehow (dis)advantaged by how they are
measured and how they are assessed vis
a vis other perspectives?
5.
If group-interests don’t matter, how does one account for the
inter-racial divide?
6.
What are some of the most interesting and surprising findings
with respect to the impact of values or principles on whites’ and blacks’
support for various racial and non-racial policies? If these race-neutral
principles are important, does that mean that racial prejudice is not an
important antecedent of such policy attitudes?
7.
How would you evaluate K&S’s
measure of racial resentment? Is it, in fact, a reasonable proxy for racial
prejudice, as K&S suggest? Why or why not? What do K&S mean by their
argument that other researchers have “whitewashed” the study of prejudice and
racial attitudes?
Sniderman
and Carmines:
8.
This is just a “touchy-feely” question: Do you think S&C
are sincere in assuming the role of liberals who are saddened about the
divisiveness of affirmative action for the liberal or Democratic coalition, or
is there something more at work here?
9.
Is opposition to affirmative action driven by prejudice,
according to the authors? Given the small variation that the authors report on
affirmative action attitudes, is anything likely to be
able to predict opposition to affirmative action, as measured this way? Are
whites opposed to all race-specific (affirmative action-like) programs? See
Figure 19, later in the book. Is opposition to affirmative action driven by
economics and self-interest? Is the authors’ evidence convincing on this
matter? Why or why not? Does it compare favorably with the evidence in K&S?
10.
Is there another way to interpret the results of the
Justification Experiment?
11.
What are the implications of the “Mere Mention” experiment,
according to S&C? S&C argue that
the “Mere Mention” experiment is not, after all, a Willie Horton ad. What do
they mean by this, and do you agree?
12.
What does the unobtrusive List Experiment tell us that is different from attitudes measured in the usual way?
13.
Is prejudice a weak predictor of whites’ racial policy views?
In what way is the power of prejudice greater on the left than the right? Does
this exonerate conservatives? Are
liberals who dislike blacks really liberals? Are conservatives who say they
like blacks really positive toward them? Do you draw the same conclusions from
the Government Dependency Experiment, Integration experiment?
14.
Does the very same policy framed in racially neutral terms
get markedly more public support than race-specific policies? Do the authors
provide compelling evidence for abandoning race-specific policies?
Feldman
and Huddy:
15.
What implications does Feldman and Huddy’s
study have for Kinder and Sanders and the measure of racial resentment? Are
there policies on which conservatives might exhibit some of the same asymmetries
as liberals?
Gilens:
16.
What implications does Gilens’ study have for Sniderman and
Carmines’ conclusions about the likely levels of public support for racial-neutral
policies versus race-specific policies?