Chapter 7 - Social Influence
THIS CHAPTER WILL DISCUSS:
1. How group decisions
often tend to be more extreme than individual decisions.
2. How groups sometimes
choose a weaker one of their options because they are not all aware of
information supporting their best choice.
3. How normative and
informational influence both explain these tendencies.
INTRODUCTION
In
this chapter, we shift attention from the issues of conformity and deviance,
which concern group structure, and focus on the process of social influence,
which occurs when group interaction causes members to conform.
We
partially discussed social influence in Chapter 6. In many experiments that we have examined so far, however,
group interaction was artificial. For instance, in some of the studies by Asch and by Sherif,
interaction was limited to the expression of choices. In other experiments, also by Asch and by Moscovici and
Schachter, interaction was artificial because the "choices" of
confederates were not subject to group influence. These contrived circumstances hide insights about the
process of social influence. Here,
we look at studies that examine more natural group interaction. We can learn more about social
influence by studying these naturally interacting groups.
We
will look at decisions that naturally interacting groups make and then turn to
proposals that account for this behavior.
All these proposals relate to the process of social influence.
Natural
Group Situations Versus Contrived Situations
We
have stated that test groups can interact artificially or naturally. This distinction influences our ability
to study the concept of social influence.
When
groups are contrived, as in the experiment of Asch that we discussed earlier,
interaction is not natural. One
reason why Asch's groups were artificial was that social influence could occur
in only one direction. The
majority could, and often did, influence the deviant. The deviant, however, could never influence the majority
because the majority was made up of confederates who had predetermined wrong
judgments of the lines. They never
changed their opinions. The
deviant was the only real participant in the experiment.
In
such situations, confederates lead the group discussion. Such artificial groups can tell us
something about how social influence works, but they cannot tell us all.
Instead,
we must turn to experiments that examine more natural, as opposed to contrived,
group discussion. As we shall see,
natural interaction reveals a great deal about the process of social influence
in groups.
Effects
of Social Influence
To
prepare for our discussion, let us consider the effects of social
influence. How might social
influence affect the decisions of a group?
Imagine
that someone asks a group of four people to make a decision. The group members can choose from among
a number of options, and they each know all these options. Every member also
has an opinion as to which option is best. Under these circumstances, group members are likely to have
differences of opinion. During the
meeting, the members state their opinions. They examine the options and discuss the reasons for their
preferences. At the end of the meeting the group must decide which option is
best.
Scientists
interested in the process of social influence have studied this type of
situation. In it, all individual
opinions somehow become "transformed" into one group decision. How
does this "transformation" take place? What is the process?
Scientists have been trying to answer these questions.
In
this chapter, we will read about some of the characteristics of this
Òtransformational process.Ó We
will also discover some of the proposed explanations for how a group moves from
a tangle of individual opinions to one group decision. All proposals look at social
influence. They each differ,
however, in their hypotheses concerning the role of social influence in the
"transformational" process.
Simpson
study. One example of a more
true-to-life study was performed by Simpson way back in 1939. Each member of a four person group
first viewed a set of four pictures and ranked the pictures in order according
to how much she or he liked them.
Then they met together and talked as a group about how to rank-order the
pictures. Finally, each person
made a second individual judgment.
It turned out that of the 108 people in the groups, the opinions of 106
converged toward the average ranking of the group members for the pictures from
their first to the second individual rankings. Looked at another way, a measure of difference in opinion
decreased an average amount of 36 percent between the two rankings.
Simpson
also asked 24 other people to rank the pictures twice without discussing them
as a group. He then treated these
peopleÕs rankings as if they were members of four-person ÒgroupsÓ so that he
could measure how much they differed from one another, the same way he did for
the rankings produced by members of real groups. In this case 18 of the peopleÕs rankings converged from the
first to the second ranking, with an average amount of 9 percent. This is a far less convergence than for
the real groups. Simpson then
concluded that, although thinking twice about the problem led to some
convergence in individual rankings, having the opportunity to talk about it
resulted in much more movement toward agreement.
Mock jury
studies. For a second example, we
return to the mock jury studies discussed in Chapter Two. Recall at that time our description of
Òsocial decision schemes.Ó Social
decision schemes are rules that groups use to combine individual membersÕ
decisions into a group decision.
For example, if the odds that a group chooses a particular option are
based on whether more than half of the members support it, then the social
decision scheme the group is using is a Òmajority model.Ó On other words, a particular option
will be chosen if a majority of the group favors it. If instead the probability that a group chooses an option is
based on the proportion of members that favor it, the group is applying a
Òproportionality model.Ó For
example, if three-quarters of the members of a group like a particular option,
the odds that the group will choose that option is three-quarters. Social decision scheme theorists then
propose mathematical equations to represent these and other models. They then see which equation best
predicts group decisions. As we
discussed in Chapter 2, research using mock juries shows that the Òmajority
modelÓ equations are normally the best predictors of jury verdicts. This finding implies that a Òmajority
winsÓ rule is likely at work in this situation.
THE GROUP
POLARIZATION EFFECT
From
what we have seen so far, it seems that when group members begin their
discussion with opinions that differ from one another, they end up with
opinions that have become closer together. If the meeting starts with a majority of the group on one
side of the issue, then the minority usually shifts to become closer to that
majority. If there is not minority
but, instead, different group members are on opposite sides, then all of them
usually meet somewhere in the middle.
This
means that if we can assign a number to represent each group memberÕs opinion
at the beginning of the discussion, then we can use a simple ÒaveragingÓ social
decision scheme to predict what the group decision will be. If, on a scale ranging from 0 to 10,
John starts the meeting at 2, Paul at 3, George at 4, and Richard at 7, then we
would expect that the group decision will be the average of these numbers, which
is 4. We would also hypothesize
that each personÕs individual viewpoint might have changed, particularly
RichardÕs.
It
turns out that things are a little more complex than that. When scientists looked at groups in
situations such as the one just described, they found a new phenomenon that has
come to be called the "group polarization effect." To understand this effect, we need to
examine the research that led to its discovery. Its discovery, in turn, led to some proposals regarding how social
influence works.
A
"Choice Dilemma"
Imagine
that someone asked a four-member group to make the following decision:
Mr. Jones is a married man with two children. He has a steady job that pays him about $60,000 a year. He can easily afford the necessities of
life, but few of the luxuries. Mr.
Jones' father died recently. He
carried a $40,000 life insurance policy.
Mr. Jones would like to invest this inheritance in stocks. He is well aware of the secure
"blue chip" stocks and bonds.
They would pay approximately six percent on his investment. On the other hand, Mr. Jones has heard
that the stock of a relatively unknown company, Company X, might double its
present value. This could happen
if the buying public favorably receives a new product which is currently in
production. However, if the public
does not like the new product, the stock would decline in value and Mr. Jones
would lose his investment.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. Jones. You must choose the lowest probability that you consider
acceptable before you would advise Mr. Jones to invest in Company X. For example, do you think that Mr.
Jones should not invest in Company X under any circumstance? Do you think that Mr. Jones should
invest in Company X only if the odds are 9 in 10 that the stock will double in
value? Or will you accept odds of
5 in 10? 1 in 10? What odds would you be willing to
accept?
As
you can see, the four members of the group face a number of different
probabilities that Company X will succeed, and they must choose from among
them. Each member has an opinion
about the lowest probability of success that he or she would accept before
advising Mr. Jones to invest in Company X. The members will probably disagree about the lowest
acceptable probability. Some might
think that even if the odds are only 3 in 10 that the stock will do well, the
opportunity is too good to pass up.
They would consider it a good gamble. Others will find these odds too
chancy. They might want odds
of 7 in 10. During the meeting,
the group members state their opinions and the reasons behind them. By the end of the meeting they must
come to a decision concerning the lowest probability that the group would
accept before advising Mr. Jones to invest in Company X.
Scientists
interested in social influence have studied this exact situation. Researchers have come to call this type
of problem a "choice dilemma."
Faced with choice dilemmas, groups must choose between two options. One option has an attractive outcome
but only some probability of success.
The other option has a less attractive outcome but will definitely
succeed. For example, a group must
choose between traveling a long way to a stadium in hopes of getting tickets to
a popular baseball game or staying at home and watching the game on
television. If they travel to the
stadium, they may miss the game entirely.
Staying at home, however, is not as much fun. The choice dilemma involves an attractive, risky plan and a
safe plan. They need to examine
the odds that they will be able to get tickets and then decide what to do.
Now
let us go back to the choice dilemma facing the group that needs to advise Mr.
Jones. In that dilemma, Company X
is the more attractive proposition.
Investing in Company X is an attractive idea, but it is a risky choice. The other option, investing in
blue-chip stocks and bonds, is less attractive but safer. It is an assured option. Mr. Jones would know exactly what he
was getting if he bought stocks and bonds.
The
group must decide the odds for success that they would require from the more
attractive but chancier option, Company X, before they recommend it.
Definition
of "Risky" and "Cautious" Decisions
Before
we look at how a "natural" group might deal with a choice dilemma,
let us define some terms.
Imagine
that the group decides to advise Mr. Jones to invest in Company X as long as
the odds are 2 in 10. This means
that the group is willing to allow Mr. Jones to take a chance with Company X
even though the company is unlikely to succeed. The group has made a "risky" choice.
In
contrast, the group advises Mr. Jones to invest in Company X only if the odds
of success are 8 in 10. In this
case, the group is willing to recommend Company X only if the company is highly
likely to succeed. The group has
made a "cautious" decision.
In
general, a group is risky if it recommends the more attractive but unsure
option at odds of success that are less than 5 in 10. In other words, if the choice has a less than 50-50 chance
for success and the group still recommends it, the group is being risky. A group is being cautious, however, if
it decides to recommend the more attractive but chancier proposition at odds of
success that are more than 5 in 10.
Possible
Decisions
What
would a "natural" group do with a choice dilemma? We can think of several possible
scenarios. Let us hypothesize
about some of them.
In
the first scenario, all members of the group have the same opinion. The group will almost always decide on
that opinion. Thus, if all four
members of our example group wanted the odds to be at least 6 in 10, the group
decision would be 6 in 10.
In
the second scenario, some group members tend toward risk and some tend toward
caution. The group decision will
probably be a compromise. We could
estimate that compromise by figuring the arithmetic average of each member's
individual opinion. For instance,
two members of our group want odds of 7 in 10, a cautious choice, and the other
two want odds of 3 in 10, a risky choice.
The arithmetic average is the probability of 5 in 10. Hence, we would expect the group to
compromise and agree that they could recommend Company X if the probability is
5 in 10.
In
a third scenario, all group members are on one side, either risk or
caution. They disagree, however,
about the exact probability they would need to choose the more attractive but
unsure option. Once again, we can
use math to predict the group's compromise. For example, two members want the probability to be 4 in 10,
and two want it to be 2 in 10.
They clearly all agree on a risky option but disagree on the acceptable
level of risk. By averaging their
opinions, we would predict that the group would most likely agree to a 3 in 10
probability of success.
Actual
Decisions
What
decisions did the "natural" groups actually make with choice
dilemmas? Were the three scenarios
we hypothesized correct?
Researchers
have experimented to see what actually occurs when groups make decisions about
choice dilemmas. Many of these
studies applied a particular experimental method. It was first used in a study
of choice dilemmas by Wallach, Kogan, and Bem (1962).
In
their study method, a number of participants first worked alone and chose
acceptable odds for each of a series of 12 choice dilemmas including the one
about Mr. Jones and his investments.
We will label each participant's first decision the "prediscussion
opinion."
Next,
the researchers placed the participants in groups, and each group made a
decision about acceptable odds.
Finally, each participant made one last individual decision about which
odds would be acceptable, again working alone. We will label the participants' last choice the
"postdiscussion opinion."
What
did the researchers find? One
significant finding related to the third scenario above. As you will recall, in that scenario
all group members are on the same side, either risk or caution. They disagree, however, about the
probability they need to recommend the more attractive, but hazardous, option. We hypothesized that we could
mathematically average the opinions of the group members and that this average
would indicate what they would eventually agree upon.
The
research findings, however, showed this idea to be false. What we expected did not happen.
For
example, we are looking at the results of a group of four people in the
experiment. The prediscussion opinions of two members leaned toward risk, but
not too much risk. They would
advise Mr. Jones to invest only if the odds were at least 4 in 10 that Company
X will succeed. The other two
members of the group were rather bold and would advise Mr. Jones to invest if
the odds were only 2 in 10 for success.
What
happened when these four people came together in a group? Earlier, we hypothesized that the group
would compromise. In this case, we
might expect the members to decide on the mathematic average of their prediscussion
opinions. This would work out to
the odds of 3 in 10.
In
the Wallach, Kogan, and Bem experiment, however, this did not happen.
Risky
Shift
In
10 out of the 12 choice dilemmas that the group examined, the eventual decision
was riskier than the mathematical average would predict. For example, the group that we imagined
above might decide that Mr. Jones should buy the stock at lower odds than the
mathematic average of 3 in 10.
They might decide on the lower, more daring odds of only 2.5 in 10.
Researchers
have called this phenomenon the "risky shift."
In
addition, researchers found that the group meetings appeared to have a lasting
influence on members. The participants'
postdiscussion opinions were riskier than their prediscussion ideas. Further, these postdiscussion opinions
approximated the group decision.
Researchers found this true both immediately after the group meeting and
several weeks later when they again asked the participants for their postdiscussion
opinions. Such a result is
evidence that members did not merely comply with their groups. Instead, an actual opinion change took
place.
The
study also examined control groups, consisting of people who voiced only two
individual opinions, with no intervening group discussion. In this situation, no shift took place.
Thus, the research showed that members need some experience of group discussion
before risky shifts can take place.
Cautious
Shift
Soon
enough, scientists discovered that groups do not always experience risky
shifts. Sometimes what happens is a
"cautious shift." The
cautious shift occurs, as its name implies, when groups make more cautious
decisions than individuals. For
example, two members of a four-person group individually decide to advise Mr.
Jones to make the risky investment at odds of 6 in 10. The other two members decide to advise
him to make the investment at odds of 8 in 10. When the group meets, its decision is more cautious than the
average of their individual opinions.
Perhaps the group decides on the odds of 7.5 in 10. It took a few years for the results of
the cautious shift to become evident to researchers.
Remember
that only 2 of the 12 choice dilemmas in the Wallach et al. study failed to
result in risky shifts. The
experimenters considered these outcomes flukes. Subsequent research, however, found these results genuine. Further studies used the 12 choice
dilemmas from the Wallach experiment and found that the same two items
consistently led to cautiousness.
Why would this happen?
Certain themes ran through these two dilemmas that caused participants
to be careful. Scientists took
this knowledge and soon learned how to write choice dilemmas that would lead to
either risky or cautious behavior.
For example, experimenters learned that they could create a cautious
shift if they described the hardships that would befall the protagonists'
dependents if the risky option should fail (Rabow et al., 1966).
Group
Polarization
Researchers
also learned that risky shifts occur when group members make daring choices
from the start. Cautious shifts
occur when members are initially rather careful. These two results come together in the overall finding of
the group polarization effect.
This effect takes place when groups have members who lean toward one
direction, either risk or caution, but do not agree on the same odds. Such groups tend to make decisions in
the direction that the members favor.
Group decisions, however, are usually more extreme than the individual
members' prediscussion judgments.
Groups
with members who lean toward the risky direction make decisions that are more
daring than the individual members would make. People who are initially cautious make extremely careful
judgments when they are in groups.
For
example, four students have a group project for a class. They must decide between two
projects. One is sure to succeed,
and they are guaranteed a grade of C.
This project is not very imaginative, however, so the highest grade they
could get would be a B. The other
project might fail, in which case they would receive a D. This project is very imaginative,
however, and if it worked out, they would get an A.
According
to the group polarization effect, if at the beginning of their discussion the
group members leaned toward the guaranteed but unimaginative project, by the
end of the meeting they would be strongly in favor of it. This would be a cautious shift. If instead they began the discussion
slightly in favor of the chancy but imaginative project, afterward they should
be enthusiastic about it. This
would be a risky shift. In both
cases, the students' opinions after the discussion were in the same direction,
but more extreme than they were before the discussion.
The
group polarization effect was an exciting and surprising discovery for the
researchers who looked at choice dilemmas. Scientists subsequently have performed hundreds of studies
exploring it.
Group Polarization and Social Influence
The
size of this work, however, is not due strictly to the surprise effect of
polarization. Another reason experimenters have devoted a great deal of time to
the polarization phenomenon is that they hope it will help them understand a
larger topic. Theorists feel that
polarization is a "window" into the larger world of social influence
and how it affects group decision making.
The hope is that the study of polarization can lead to a general theory
of social influence in groups.
We
have centered our discussion on the choice dilemma. Polarization effects also occur in tasks other than those
associated with risk. For
instance, polarization occurs when groups deal with attitude extremity, when
they guess light "movement" in autokinetic research, when they are
involved in gambling, and when they need to decide how difficult a problem can
get before they are no longer willing to tackle it. Thus, the research regarding polarization has been very
extensive, and experiments have involved many tasks.
Predicting Group Polarization
One
example of this research was performed by Davis, Kerr, Sussman, and Rissman
(1974). They used social decision
schemes to examine what happens when a group polarizes around either a risky or
a cautious option.
The majority model. Specifically, they wanted to see which
social decision scheme was best able to predict group polarization. Their findings were similar to what
Davis discovered when he looked at juries. Again, the majority model was the best predictor. The group is likely to polarize around
the option that the majority prefers.
For
example, in a four person group all members lean toward caution but differ in
their prediscussion opinions. Two
members want odds of 8 in 10, another member wants odds of 7 in 10, the other,
the least cautious, wants 6 in 10.
The average of these odds is 7.25 in 10. The majority model, on the
other hand, predicts that the group's decision will be for the odds of 8 in 10.
If
the majority model is correct, the group's decision will be more extreme, in
the direction of either risk or caution, than the mathematical average of the
members' prediscussion opinions.
In essence, in this circumstance, the majority model predicts a
polarization effect.
This
is exactly what happened in the Davis et al. study for both cautious and risky
shifts.
Limits of the majority model. These findings alone, however, do not
indicate that the majority model will always predict the group polarization
effect. It is easy to think of
circumstances in which the majority model does not do so. In our example, the majority opinion
was also the most polarized. The
two people who agreed on the odds of 8 in 10 made up the majority, and their
opinion was also the most extreme, or polarized. In this case, the majority model predicted group
polarization correctly. If the
majority opinion was not also the most polarized, however, difficulties
arise. In these circumstances, the
majority model would not predict group polarization.
In
an alternative group, two members want odds of 6 in 10. They make up the majority opinion. One other member wants odds of 7 in 10,
and the last wants even more cautious odds of 8 in 10. All members are on the side of caution;
however, the members in the majority are the least cautious. In this case, the arithmetic average is
6.75 in 10. The majority model, on
the other hand, predicts a group decision for the odds of 6 in 10. Hence, the majority model does not
predict group polarization, but a decision that reflects the opinions of the
least cautious members.
Therefore,
the majority model predicts that polarization will take place only if the group
majority includes the most polarized members. This happened in the Davis et al. study. The group majorities usually included
the most polarized members. That
was why the majority model was a successful predictor of group polarization in
their study.
Moreover,
this is what appears to occur in general.
When facing choice dilemmas, groups usually have a majority of members
with a more extreme view than the minority. As a result of group discussion, the minority membersÕ
opinions converge toward those of the majority, in so doing becoming more
extreme. Therefore, what happens
in group polarization is consistent with what happens in other situations in
which social influence takes place; individual member opinions converge, and
minorities move toward majorities.
General Social Influence Theories
In the past three decades, two
theories attempting to explain how group polarization works have come into
general acceptance among scientists.
Further, scholars believe that these proposals go beyond choice dilemmas
and relate to all types of group decisions.
Why
would they think this? As we know,
scientists first discovered the group polarization effect when they studied
choice dilemmas. After examining
group polarization, scholars came to believe that it is a window into the
larger process of social influence.
Hence, by looking at group polarization, they could discover more about
how social influence affects all kinds of group decision-making tasks. To look at group polarization, however,
scholars still used choice dilemmas as a basis for research and proposals. In essence, choice dilemmas help
scholars examine and theorize about group polarization, and group polarization
helps them look at social influence.
For
all these reasons, proposals that relate to choice dilemmas also relate to all
types of group decisions. In
particular, the two theories reflect larger ideas about how social influence
works in all types of group contexts.
Next, we will turn to a discussion of both these larger ideas about
social influence and of the two theories based on those ideas that are
specifically relevant to group polarization.
NORMATIVE
INFLUENCE
The
first of the larger ideas about how social influence works in discussion groups
is called normative influence.
Normative influence occurs when group members listen to one another
express opinions about the available options. The claim is that members come into a group with prediscussion
opinions. During their meeting,
members share these opinions.
Through this process, each person learns the other members'
preferences. We would then hypothesize
that members are likely to adopt the option of the majority. For example, Tom hears that others in
his group like Option A but dislike Option X. If normative influence occurs, this alone would be enough to
cause Tom to favor Option A. In
essence, social influence occurs because people want to agree with the
majority. In the end, the group
chooses the majority viewpoint.
An
important aspect of normative influence is that social influence occurs when
people believe that the majority viewpoint is correct just because it is the
majority. In the above example,
Tom thinks to himself that Option A must be better than Option X because he
respects all of the other members in his group, so he believes that their
opinion must be correct. It is
important not to confuse normative influence with compliance, as we discussed
it in Chapter 6. When compliance
occurs, group members voice the majority position but do not believe it. With normative influence, group members
come to privately accept the majority point of view.
Research
in Support of Normative Influence
We
have already run across several examples of social influence in which theories
consistent with normative influence.
In
Chapter 5, for instance, we discussed research related to expectation states
theory (Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977). Participants who believed that they were lower than others
in an imaginary skill performed phony tasks. The skill might be something like "contrast
sensitivity." The phony task
supposedly related to the imaginary skill. Researchers showed these participants answers that supposedly
came from people who were allegedly more skilled at the task than the
participants were. When these
answers disagreed with the participants' decisions, the participants were
likely to change their minds and agree with the answers they saw. In other words, merely learning the
other opinions could influence a participant's decision. Thus, the results of expectation states
research are consistent with the existence of normative influence.
Much
of the research we discussed in Chapter 6 also seems to reflect normative
influence. For example, Asch's
(1956) study of conformity found that participants agreed with the majority
opinion even when that opinion was wrong.
As you can recall, participants looked at the lengths of lines, and 33 participants
conformed to the confederates' wrong answers in at least two-thirds of the
trials. In interviews after the
experiment, about half these conformists claimed that they saw the line
correctly but that they decided their own perceptions must have been wrong when
they heard the majority choice.
They went along with the majority judgment even though it was wrong.
In
Moscovici, Lage, and Naffrechoux's (1969) study of minority influence,
researchers saw that a minority opinion can also affect group members. Confederates, who were in the minority,
claimed that a series of blue slides were green. These statements influenced participants when they later had
to judge a second series of slides, which were of a color they could easily
call either blue or green.
In
all three cases, participants heard only the judgments that other people made,
not arguments about those judgments.
The mere act of hearing the opinions influenced them, a finding
consistent with the presence of normative influence.
Jury
Decision Models
Some
mathematical models of jury decision making differ from those we have studied
so far in that they do not use social decision schemes. These models assume that jury deliberation
is important. During deliberation,
jurors can be persuaded to change their initial opinions. Scientists have attempted to represent
this deliberation process mathematically.
In
addition to showing that the majority tends to persuade the minority most of
the time in a jury, research has revealed a "momentum effect": When
members of the minority start to join the majority, other minority members
begin to agree with the majority at an ever-faster rate. The momentum slows for
the last one or two people in the minority, however. They are usually more sure of their opinions, and persuading
them to change their minds is more difficult (Penrod & Hastie, 1980).
These
models are consistent with the impact of normative influence because of the way
they hypothesize that social influence works. The models assume that social influence occurs when jurors
hear one another's opinions. The
models concern the number of jurors originally on each side of an issue. They estimate the probability that
jurors will change their minds and how quickly that will happen, given the
number of jurors on each side. The
models implicitly assume that to predict changes in jurors' minds they need
look only at the opinions the jurors expressed to one another.
The
Social Comparison Approach to Group Polarization
A
specific theory consistent with normative influence that has been applied to
the study of group polarization is social comparison theory. We discussed social comparison theory
in Chapter 6 as an explanation for conformity. In that theory, Festinger
distinguished between "beliefs about abilities" and
"opinions." He stated
that beliefs about abilities have a good/bad dimension. People want to move toward the good end
of the scale and away from the bad.
In contrast, Festinger believed that opinions have no analogous good/bad
dimension. Instead, people must
choose the group consensus as a norm to follow and shift toward that norm if
they want to feel that they have correct opinions.
Baron et
al. Study.
Baron, Dion, Baron, and Miller (1971) performed a study that they
believed to demonstrate the power of normative influence in groups. As we mentioned earlier in this
chapter, scientists have learned how to write choice dilemmas that lead
predictably to either risky or cautious shifts. In the Baron et al. study, single participants was placed in
four-member groups. The other
three members of the groups were confederates instructed to argue either for
risk or for caution. In one-fourth
of the discussions, the group was given a choice dilemma normally leading to
cautious shifts and the confederates argued for caution. Not surprisingly, the participantsÕ
opinions shifted toward greater caution.
In another one-fourth, the group was given a choice dilemma usually
tending toward risk, and the confederates argued for risk. Again as one would expect, the
participantsÕ views moved toward greater risk.
Two
other circumstances were more critical.
In a third one-fourth of the discussions, the group was faced what was
typically a cautious-shift-provoking choice dilemma, but the confederates
argued for risk. In the final
fourth, the participants read a risky-shift-oriented choice dilemma but heard cautious-arguing
confederates. In these two cases,
would the participants shift their opinions toward the item or toward their
groupmates?
The
answer was their fellow group members.
Baron et al. interpreted this finding as consistent with the idea that,
when facing a choice dilemma, group members look to one another for the correct
option, and move their opinion to the majority point of view. This interpretation is consistent with
normative influence.
Research into the Theory
The
social comparison approach to group polarization assumes that all that is
necessary for social influence to occur in a group is that members hear one
another express their opinions. Group
members need not hear arguments about the advantages or disadvantages of either
risk or caution to change their opinions toward the group majority. All that they need to hear is the prediscussion
opinions of the other members.
Each person can then decide whether his or her opinion is consistent
with the rest of the group. This
implies that group polarization will still occur in groups in which the members
cannot argue for a particular option.
Scientists
can artificially constrain group discussion so that members can voice only
their prediscussion opinions. They
cannot discuss arguments for or against either risk or caution. Teger and Pruitt (1967) placed these
artificial constraints on groups and found that group polarization did occur
under these circumstances. The
amount of polarization, however, was not as great as in "normal"
discussion groups.
Teger
and Pruitt's results imply that social comparison may partly account for the
group polarization effect. Social
comparison is not the entire reason, however, because polarization was smaller
than usual in their constrained groups.
In the same vein, Isenberg (1986) reviewed relevant studies and found
that social comparison had a consistent but only moderate effect on group
polarization in those studies.
As
we know, to understand social influence completely, we need to understand why
the group polarization effect occurs.
We have seen how the research comes close to supporting the social
comparison approach to group polarization. Therefore, normative influence appears to be a viable but
incomplete explanation for how social influence occurs in groups.
Figure
7.1 diagrams the social influence process from the standpoint of social
comparison theory. The process is
divided into input, process, and output stages. These stages are equivalent to the stages in the
input-process-output model we discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. In this and subsequent diagrams in this
chapter. the input steps occur before group discussion begins, the process
steps occur during discussion, and the output steps are the results of
discussion.
FIGURE 7.1
Input |
Process |
Output |
|
INDIVIDUAL PREDISCUSSIONˆ OPINIONS |
EXCHANGE OF PREDISCUSSIONˆ OPINIONS |
INDIVIDUAL POSTDISCUSSIONˆ OPINIONS |
GROUP DECISION |
INFORMATIONAL
INFLUENCE
The
second of the larger ideas about social influence in groups is called
informational influence.
Informational influence can occur when group members learn new
information about the available options.
As with normative influence, the claim is that members come into a group
with prediscussion opinions. In
contrast, the hypothesis is that the group members talk about their opinions
during their meeting. Their
discussion centers on the advantages and disadvantages of each option. Through this type of discussion, each
member learns more about the options.
This new information often causes members to change their opinions. The group then uses the members' new
opinions to help it decide on the best option.
In
Contrast with Normative Influence
Comparing
normative and informational influence helps us to understand the latter. As you can recall, normative influence
assumes that social influence occurs when people learn the opinions of others
and, as a result, change their minds to agree more with them. Proponents of normative influence do
not focus on what happens when a group discusses the strengths and weaknesses
of options. They do not think this is significant in the social influence
process.
Supporters
of informational influence, on the other hand, look carefully at what happens
when group members argue about the strengths and weaknesses of their
options. They believe that this
discussion is responsible for social influence and do not feel that group members
will change their minds merely because they learn other members' opinions. They believe that group members need to
have new information before social influence can occur.
Research
in Support of Informational Influence
One
example of research that supports the idea of informational influence is
Sherif's (1935) study of how people judged imaginary "movements" of a
stationary point of light.
Participants formed standards for judgment about the range of the
light's "movements."
When two or three participants made judgments in the presence of one another,
their standards converged over time.
Although they were not presenting ÒargumentsÓ as such, these
participantsÕ verbalized judgments can be looked at as information about light
movement that persuaded one another to adopt the same judgmental standard. A second example also covered last
chapter was minority influence. It
may not happen a lot, but when it does, by definition it is influence contrary
to the group Ònorm.Ó Therefore, it
is almost certainly a product of informational influence.
Outside
of what we have covered in this book, there are many examples of information
influence in the work that scientists have done in the area of persuasion. Scientists have performed a number of
studies to determine whether communicative messages that include evidence as
part of a persuasive appeal are more successful in changing opinions than
messages that do not contain such arguments.
For
example, a communicator is trying to persuade you to brush your teeth every
day. One of her claims is that, if you don't do this, your teeth will rot and
fall out. In essence, the person
has expressed an opinion. If you
don't brush daily, your teeth will fall out. Will this opinion be more likely to persuade you if evidence
backs it up? This is the question that interests scientists. They want to know
if the communicator will be more likely to persuade you to brush your teeth
every day if she presents evidence supporting the claim that unbrushed teeth
rot and fall out than if she does not present such evidence. Reinard (1988) has reviewed many such
studies, which indicate that evidence does increase the persuasive power of
messages. These findings are
consistent with the importance of informational influence. They show that a person wanting to
change opinions effectively, needs to present arguments for an opinion. Simply expressing that opinion is not
enough.
Now
let us examine how this idea relates to the group polarization effect.
The
Persuasive Arguments Approach to Group Polarization
Burnstein
and Vinokur (1973) proposed the persuasive arguments approach, which claims
that, when group members must choose from among a number of options, they all
know something about each option.
Every person has bits of knowledge that can be viewed as arguments
either for or against each option.
Members base their prediscussion opinions on these arguments.
During
group discussion, members talk over the familiar arguments. They support or criticize each option,
hearing arguments they had not heard before. They learn new information that gives them reasons to
polarize their opinions further.
At the end of the discussion, the group bases its decision on the
members' further-polarized opinions. Consequently, the group decision will be
more polarized than an average of its members' prediscussion opinions.
Example of Process
Let
us illustrate this process. Sandra
and Harvey face a choice dilemma individually. Sandra thinks of three reasons
(A, B, and C) to be risky. She can
think of only two reasons (M and N) to be cautious. Therefore, Sandra chooses to be slightly daring and selects
the slightly risky odds of 4 in 10.
Harvey also leans toward risk but sees other reasons for his choice. He finds reasons A, B, and D for daring
behavior and finds reasons N and O to be cautious. He therefore also chooses the slightly risky odds of 4 in
10.
When
these two meet in a group, they learn from each other new reasons to be risky.
Sandra hears Harvey's reason D, and Harvey hears Sandra's reason C. Thus, they both have four reasons to be
daring--A, B, C, and D. Each now
has more cause to be risky. Their
personal opinions polarize.
Perhaps they now favor riskier odds of 3 in 10. Their group decision will then be
riskier than their prediscussion opinions.
Research into Proposal
The
persuasive arguments approach to the group polarization effect assumes that the
single factor of members learning new information about the group's options can
cause social influence. Burnstein
and Vinokur did not see a sharing of opinions as a significant part of the
process that changes group members' opinions. They believed that new information is sufficient to cause
social influence. In addition, an
advocate of persuasive arguments theory might argue that the Baron et al.
findings described above are consistent with it, and not with social comparison
theory. In that study, the
confederates presented a number of arguments for their point of view. This means that, for example, when
faced with a choice dilemma implying cautious values but confederates
instructed to support risk, the real participants are hearing arguments in
favor of risk, some of which might be new to them. It could be the impact of these arguments that lead the
participants to become more risky, and not just, as Baron et al. supposed, just
the fact that the majority of the group favors risk.
There
has been a great deal of research examining the persuasive arguments
theory. In general, the results of
this research have been supportive.
For example, Ebbesen and Bowers (1974) counted the number of statements
that groups made in support of the risky and cautious alternatives when talking
about choice dilemmas. They
discovered that the more that the discussion arguments favored risk, the more
risky shift occurred in the group membersÕ opinions. Analogously, the more that the discussion arguments tilted
toward caution, the more cautious the participants became. In addition, St. Jean (1970) restricted
group discussion to arguments and forbid group members to state their
opinions. His groups polarized
anyway.
Isenberg (1986) reviewed many
studies like these and found a strong relationship between the effects of
persuasive arguments and group polarization. Most theorists now believe that a good theory about both
group polarization in specific and social influence in general must include
some aspects of persuasive arguments.
Limits of the Proposal
However,
persuasive arguments theory has problems accounting for certain research
data. These problems come from one
underlying assumption of the persuasive arguments approach. The approach presumes that the
arguments that are voiced during discussion are representative of the arguments
with which the members of the group are familiar. As a consequence, the proportion of arguments on either side
of the issue that come up during discussion equal the proportion of arguments
that members know on both sides.
In our example, sixty percent of the arguments that both Sandra and
Harvey are familiar with are in favor of risk and forty percent are for
caution. The persuasive arguments
approach implies that sixty percent of the arguments that come up during their
discussion will also be for risk, and forty percent of the arguments will favor
caution.
However,
there is strong evidence suggesting that this assumption is wrong.
Bias
in discussion. As
just mentioned, persuasive arguments theory presumes that the proportion of
arguments that are brought up during discussion on either side of the issue is
about the same as the proportion of arguments on either side with which members
of the group are familiar. If so,
then discussion should also include arguments new to each member on the disfavored
side of the issue. Sandra will
voice reason M to be cautious some time during the discussion, and Harvey will
voice reason O. As a result, both
will learn new arguments in favor of caution along with new arguments in favor
of risk. These new arguments on
either side of the issue will approximately cancel one another out, leaving
Harvey and SandraÕs opinions unchanged.
Therefore, group polarization will not occur. In fact, group polarization could only
occur if the assumption of equal proportions of arguments is wrong and
arguments are biased in favor of the side that the members originally
favor.
There
are studies that suggest that discussion in biased in this manner. One of them was performed by myself
(Pavitt, 1994). For three choice
dilemmas, some of the participants were asked to write down the arguments they
knew on both sides of the issue.
Then they made a decision about each dilemma in three- or four-member
groups. A content analysis was
performed in order to determine the proportion of arguments on both sides of
the issue in both the written lists and the discussion. The discussion was consistently more
polarized than the written lists.
When participants leaned toward risk, 57 percent of their written
arguments but 86 percent of their voiced arguments favored risk. When participants leaned toward
caution, 60 percent of their written arguments but 83 percent of their voiced
arguments favored caution. This
finding implies that the discussion is biased in favor of prediscussion
opinions.
Why
do group members seem to talk so much about ideas that favor the group
opinion? Why don't they instead
reveal more of their personal arguments on the disfavored side? The persuasive arguments theory cannot
answer these questions. It does
not account for the disproportion between personal opinion arguments and group
decision arguments.
Conclusion
It
seems that the persuasive arguments proposal can account for some outcomes but
not all. It does explain the
effect of arguments during group discussion. It cannot reveal, however, why the group tends to verbalize
only those arguments that favor the original group option. Therefore, it cannot account for the
hidden profile effect.
Figure
7.2 diagrams the social influence process from the standpoint of persuasive
arguments theory.
FIGURE 7.2
Input |
Process |
Output |
||
PROPORTION OF
INDIVIDUALˆ PREDISCUSSION ARGUMENTS |
INDIVIDUAL PREDISCUSSION OPINIONSˆ |
DISCUSSION OF
ARGUMENTSˆ |
INDIVIDUAL POSTDISCUSSIONˆ OPINIONS |
GROUP DECISION |
NORMATIVE
AND INFORMATIONAL INFLUENCE COMBINED
We
have seen that some scientists have hypothesized that opinion expression is the
key to social influence in groups while others have theorized that new
information can cause group members to change their minds. Both viewpoints have a lot of support
in research, which leads us to conclude that both are probably involved in
social influence when groups discuss choice dilemmas. There is good reason to conclude that social influence
includes both normative and informational aspects working together.
We
can propose a model for how this occurs.
It begins with the proposal from persuasive arguments theory that people
think of arguments in favor of both the risky and cautious choice dilemma options
and decide to favor the option that has the greater number of favorable
arguments. However, unlike
persuasive arguments theory, we do not presume that the arguments that come up
during discussion are representative of all the arguments known by group
members. Instead, members only
bring up arguments that are consistent with what they think is the better
option. Assuming that there is a
group majority supporting one of the options, which usually happens with choice
dilemmas, group discussion will then be biased in favor of that option. As a result, although group discussion
leads to members learning new arguments relevant to their decision, they only
learn more about the option that the members originally favored. Therefore their opinions become more
extreme, and group polarization occurs.
In
addition to discussing arguments, group members also exchange their
prediscussion preference for one of the two options. In fact, this is usually the first thing that happens during
group discussion, before any relevant arguments are mentioned. If group members see that there is a
group majority, normative influence is bound to happen. In fact, perhaps one of the reasons
that the arguments that come out during discussion are so biased in support of
the proposal that the majority favors is that everyone knows that this is
groupÕs favored option.
The
Proposal and Group Polarization
Let
us see how this proposal would explain the group polarization effect.
As
you can recall, in a previous example, Sandra and Harvey face a choice dilemma.
Sandra thinks of three reasons (A, B, and C) to be risky. She can think of only two reasons (M
and N) to be cautious. She decides
to select the slightly risky odds for success of only 4 in 10. Harvey also
thinks of three reasons to be risky.
Two (A and B) are the same as Sandra's, but the third (D) is different. He comes up with two reasons (N and O)
to be cautious. He also decides to
accept the slightly risky odds of 4 in 10. According to persuasive arguments theory, when Sandra talks
with Harvey, she learns another argument for risk, D. Harvey also learns another argument for risk from Sandra,
C. Together they both now have
four reasons to be risky--A, B, C, and D.
Because they both now have more reason to be risky, their opinions
polarize toward more risk.
Persuasive
arguments theory alone, however, cannot explain why Sandra and Harvey do not
also talk about their other arguments, which support caution. If they were to talk about these,
Sandra would learn a new cautious argument (O) from Harvey, and Harvey would
learn a new cautious argument (M) from Sandra. Together they would now have three reasons to be cautious:
M, N, and O. These cautious
arguments would counteract the persuasive effect of the new risky arguments
they learned from each other.
Therefore, their opinions would not polarize.
What
then accounts for the polarization?
First, because both Sandra and Harvey decide to favor risk, they will
tend to only bring up arguments that support their decision. Second, even before bringing up those
arguments, they will exchange their preference for 4 out of 10 odds. According to social comparison theory, their
original decision to support a risky choice is reinforced by knowing that they
are in agreement about that. Thus,
they never mention the arguments for caution. In this way, our proposal accounts for the group
polarization effect. By combining
social comparison theory with the persuasive arguments approach, we show how
group polarization can occur.
Figure
7.3 diagrams the social influence process from the standpoint of the combined
social comparison/persuasive arguments proposal. Note that this diagram implies a Òdual-processÓ
account. The exchange of
prediscussion opinions has a direct effect on postdiscussion opinions due to
normative influence. However, the
trading of prediscussion opinions is also followed by the discussion of
relevant arguments, which then impacts on postdiscussion opinions through
informational influence. As the
proportion of relevant arguments occurring during discussion is usually
consistent with the majority prediscussion viewpoint, both types of influence
normally reinforce one another in their effect on postdiscussion opinions and
eventual group decisions.
FIGURE 7.3
Input |
|
|||
INDIVIDUAL PROPORTION OF PREDISCUSSIONˆ OPINIONS |
INDIVIDUAL PREDISCUSSION-> OPINIONS |
DECISION ON BETTER ----------ˆ SIDE OF ISSUE |
|
|
Process |
Output |
|||
EXCHANGE OF------- PREDISCUSSIONˆ OPINIONS |
--------------------------ˆ DISCUSSION OF--ˆ ARGUMENTS |
INDIVIDUAL POSTDISCUSSIONˆ OPINIONS |
GROUP DECISION |
|
THE
HIDDEN PROFILE EFFECT
Thus
far, we have seen that both normative and informational factors appear to be
involved in social influence during the discussion of choice dilemmas. As scientists see the study of choice
dilemmas as providing insight into more general social influence processes, it
should not be surprising to find that both forms of persuasion are also
relevant in other circumstances.
Let us now turn to another often-researched situation.
Suppose that Jeff, Betsy, and
Becky are trying to choose the best candidate for student body president. Jeff is aware of four reasons to favor
Candidate A (W, X, Y, and Z) and two reasons to favor Candidate B (A and B). He therefore leans toward Candidate A
as his prediscussion opinion.
Betsy
has also come up with four reasons to support Candidate A (W, X, Y, and Z) and
two reasons to favor Candidate B (C and D). Thus, she also prefers Candidate A.
Similarly,
Becky knows two reasons in support of Candidate A (W, X, Y, and Z) and two
arguing for Candidate B (E and F).
As with her groupmates, she would choose Candidate A.
As you can see, all three of them
have thought of the same four arguments favoring Candidate A. On the other hand, they thought of
completely different arguments supporting Candidate B. Together they have a total of six such
arguments: A, B, C, D, E, and F.
Because together they have more arguments for Candidate B than Candidate
A, will they all change their minds after they talk to one another? Yes, according to persuasive arguments
theory. This theory hypothesizes
that the three of them would talk openly with one another and learn all about
the arguments for risk that they all know. In turn, this would cause them to change their preferences
from Candidate A to Candidate B.
No, according to social comparison theory. Because each favor Candidate A, they would begin discussion
by exchanging those preferences and learn that they agree. This would reinforce their original
preferences, and consequently they would limit their discussion to the four
reasons for supporting Candidate A.
In
order to see which theoryÕs prediction would be supported, Stasser and Titus
(1985) examined circumstances such as this. In their study, groups were asked to decide which of three
hypothetical candidates would be the best student body president. In the groups, each member was given a
list of information about the candidates.
Some of this information was ÒsharedÓ; it was given to all of the group
members. The rest of the
information was ÒunsharedÓ; provided to only one of the group members. The lists were manipulated so
that the shared information all favored one candidate but the unshared favored
a different one. Further, each
member had more pieces of shared information than unshared. Therefore, the information each member
was individually aware of favored the weaker candidate. For this reason, social comparison
theory would predict that all the members would choose that candidate for their
prediscussion opinion. However, if
the group ÒpooledÓ all of the information they were given, they would then
learn that a different candidate was really the best. In that case, the group members would change their minds and
decide in favor of that stronger candidate. This latter result follows from persuasive arguments theory.
Stasser and Titus found that
groups did not successfully pool all of their information. Instead, each member continued to
support the weaker candidate, and the group made the wrong choice. Stasser and TitusÕs finding makes sense
if the members of these groups only discussed the arguments on the side of the weaker
candidate that each member originally favored and the reasons for choosing the
stronger candidate were never mentioned.
Many later studies determined that this is true; groups both bring up
and, after the first time, repeat the shared information favoring the weaker
candidate much more often than the unshared information supporting the stronger
candidate. In addition, if asked
to recall information after the group decision is made, they remember the
shared items more often than the unshared. Thus the arguments favoring the stronger candidate remain
hidden from their consideration.
Because of this, Stasser and Titus called this phenomenon the hidden
profile effect.
The
Information Sampling Model
The information sampling model
was proposed by Stasser and Titus (1987) as an attempt to explain the Òhidden
profileÓ effect and other research findings that are inconsistent with
persuasive arguments theory. The
information sampling model starts with the idea that there is a given
probability that an individual will think of a particular item of relevant
information during group discussion.
Beyond that idea, the model makes four presumptions. First, it is assumed that every item of
relevant information has an equal chance of being thought of by any group
member who is familiar with it. In
other words, all pieces of information are equally memorable. Second, it is assumed that all group
members are equally good at thinking of pieces of information that they are
knowledgeable about. Third, it is
assumed that whether one group member thinks of a given piece of information
has no effect on whether another member of the group thinks of that piece of
information. Fourth, it is assumed
that if a group member thinks of an item of information, that member will bring
it up in group discussion.
Given
these presumptions, let us presume that the odds that each of the members of
the student body president group think of an item of information relevant to
their groupÕs decision is .4. Let
us also presume that Betsy and Becky are aware of a particular piece of
information, whereas Jeff is not.
If the odds that Betsy, for example, thinks of a given item is .4, then
the odds that Betsy will not think of that item is 1 minus .4, or
.6. Now, as the odds that Becky thinks
of that item of information is also .4, then the odds that neither Betsy
nor Becky will think of it is .6 times .6, or .36. Thus the odds that either Betsy or Becky will
think of it and contribute it to group discussion are 1 minus .36, or .64.
In
general, if the probability that one member of a group will not think of
a given piece of information is one minus the odds that this member will think
of it, then the odds that no group member will think of and bring up the
piece is
[1 -
probability of member recall] n
and the odds that at least one member will think of and bring it
up is
1 - [1 -
probability of member recall] n
with n equaling the number of group members who are knowledgeable of
that item. Thus if Jeff were also
aware of that item of information, then the odds that it would be recalled by
at least one of the investment group members is .78. As you may recall it from Chapter 2, this model and the
reasoning behind it is analogous to Lorge and SolomonÕs (1955) Model A.
Let
us clarify the difference between the information sampling model and persuasive
arguments theory. As described
earlier, persuasive arguments theory implies that a given piece of information
is equally likely to come up no matter whether all or only one member of the
group knows it. This is one of the
ways in which persuasive arguments theory predicts an unbiased discussion. In contrast, the information sampling
model implies that the more group members who know a piece of information, the
more likely it will be recalled.
This leads to bias in group discussion.
An
example of this type of bias is the hidden profile effect. Recall that in Stasser and TitusÕs
(1985) study uncovering this effect, items of information known to all group
members, or ÒsharedÓ among them, had more effect on their groupÕs decision than
ÒunsharedÓ items of information, those that only one member was familiar
with. This is implied by the
information sampling model. Recall
that in our first example, all three members of the investment group were
familiar with four arguments but only one member with each of the other six. The information sampling model leads to
the prediction that the four shared arguments are more likely to come up during
discussion and affect the groupÕs decision than the six unshared arguments.
There
are several implications of this idea.
First, the more group members that are aware of an item of information, the
more likely that item will in essence dominate group discussion by ÒcrowdingÓ out
unshared items of information.
Stasser and Titus (1987) found research support for this
implication. The researchers gave
participants either 12 or 24 items of information relevant to a topic, and then
formed groups in which either 33 or 66 percent of these items had been given to
every member. Next, the groups discussed
the topic. Afterward, each
participant was asked to recall the information that came up during
discussion. The researchers were
interested in discovering the proportion of the information the participants
recalled that was not originally given to them and thus learned during
group discussion. When only 33
percent of the information was shared, one-third of the recalled information
was learned during discussion if there were 12 items originally given and
one-fifth was learned during discussion if there were 24 items originally
given. In contrast, when 66
percent of the information was shared, only one-tenth of the recalled
information was learned during discussion, no matter how many items were
originally given. In summary, the
more shared information, the less new information the participants learned
during discussion. In some way,
the shared information crowded the unshared out. It is likely that the unshared information was not brought
up during discussion.
Unfortunately, Stasser and Titus did not content analyze the discussion,
so we cannot be sure if this is what occurred.
A
second implication of the information sampling model is that the larger the
group, the more likely that unshared information will not come out. This is because as the group gets
larger, the likelihood that a shared item of information is thought of and
brought up in discussion also gets larger; but no analogous increase occurs for
unshared information. Thus the
shared information is more likely to crowd out the unshared. However, research by Stasser, Taylor
& Hanna (1989) was only partly in support of this second implication. The researchers performed content
analyses of the discussion of 3- and 6-member groups. In the 3-member groups, 32 percent of the shared information
and 18 percent of the unshared info came up during discussion. In the 6-member groups, 58 percent of
the shared information was mentioned during discussion. This is a greater proportion than in
the 3-person groups, which is consistent with the information sampling
model. However, 19 percent of the
unshared information was discussed.
This is basically the same proportion as in the 3-member groups; the
information sampling model would have predicted that the proportion in the 6-member
groups would be distinctly lower.
It
is important to note that several of the assumptions of the information
sampling model are unrealistic.
Some pieces of information are more memorable than others, some people
are better at thinking of pieces of information than others, and people do not
always contribute every item of information they think of. Nonetheless, it is clear that the
information sampling model is a better representation of group information
utilization than persuasive arguments theory. In particular, only the information sampling model predicts
that shared information is more likely to come up in group discussion, and as a
result has a greater impact on group decisions, than unshared information. The model presumes this occurs because
shared information is more likely to be thought of by group members. At least three additional reasons have
also been proposed for this bias.
First, group members are likely to consider shared information more
reliable and trustworthy just because more members are familiar with it
(Larson, Foster-Fishman & Keys, 1994). Second, shared information has greater odds of being
remembered over the entire discussion than unshared information. This is because group members are in a
sense being exposed to shared information more often than unshared. Not only is it part of their original
base of knowledge, they are more likely to hear it repeated during discussion
(Larson et al., 1994). Third, a
desire for conformity may lead group members to not discuss unshared
information (Larson, Christiansen, Abbott & Franz, 1996).
ÒOpportunitiesÓ
for Information
The
next theoretical advance in the study of information utilization is found in
Larson, Foster-Fishman & Keys (1994).
Larson et al.Õs thinking was actually an extension of the information
sampling model. It is based on the
idea that the odds that a given item of information will come up in group
discussion is based on the number of ÒopportunitiesÓ that item has of being
thought of by a group member. The
number of opportunities for a given piece of information is equal to the size
of the group. So, to return to our
first example, if only Jeff is aware of an argument for Candidate B, then that
argument has one opportunity to come up, but as all members are aware of an
argument for Candidate A, that argument has three opportunities.
In
a group with a given size, the number of opportunities for shared items of
information to occur during discussion equals the number of shared items
multiplied by the size of the group.
Therefore, as all the members of the group are familiar with the 4 pieces
of information supporting Candidate A, there are 12 opportunities for shared
pieces to come up. In contrast,
the number of opportunities for unshared items of information to occur during
discussion equals that number multiplied by 1, the member who knows it. As there are 6 items of unshared
information among the members of the investment group, then there are only 6
opportunities for them to come up.
In a mathematical sense, this accounts for why:
1 - shared information has an advantage during discussion. The number of shared items multiplied
by group size will normally be greater than the number of unshared items
multiplied by group size.
2 - larger groups accentuate this effect. In a larger group, the number of shared items multiplied by
group size is proportionally greater than in a smaller group.
3 - a larger proportion of shared information accentuates this
effect. With more shared
information, the number of shared items multiplied by group size is
proportionally greater.
This third issue is particularly important, because it also implies that
shared information will not have an advantage during discussion if the
proportion of unshared information is large enough to overcome the group size
effect. Let us imagine that the
group members are all familiar with 2 pieces of information favoring Candidate
A, while there are 10 pieces of information favoring Candidate B unshared among
them. In this case, the number of
opportunities for unshared items to come up (10) is greater than the number of
opportunities for shared items (2 items multiplied by 3 members equals 6
opportunities). Thus the bias for
shared information will not occur if there is a large enough proportion
of unshared information.
A
further implication concerns changes over time in the number of opportunities
for shared and unshared information to come up during discussion. Each time that an item of information
comes up for the first time during discussion, the total number of opportunities
to bring forth as-yet-undiscussed items of information goes down by the number
of members who know that item. If Jeff
were to bring up one of the shared arguments in favor of the investment, given
that all three group members are familiar with it, then the total number of
opportunities for shared arguments to come up later in the discussion would
decrease by three. In contrast, if
Lisa were to bring up an unshared argument favoring Candidate B, then the total
number of opportunities for unshared arguments would only go down by one. As you can see, the number of
opportunities to bring up new pieces of shared information will go down faster
than the number for unshared information.
Thus the bias for shared information will decrease as discussion
continues. The rate of this
decrease can be calculated. For
example, if the group has among them 10 shared and 10 unshared pieces of
information, the odds that the first item of information is shared will be .75
but that the sixteenth item will be shared will be .30.
As
with any scientific model, Larson et al.Õs refinement of the information
sampling model includes some unrealistic assumptions. For example, it presumes that a piece of information will
only come up once in discussion, ignoring the fact that previously discussed
information is often repeated.
Nonetheless, Larson and associates have found evidence for these
implications. For example,
Larson, Christiansen, Abbott, and Franz (1996) gave three-member medical teams
both shared and unshared information about some hypothetical medical cases and
asked them to diagnose the cases.
The probability that an item of information was shared decreased from
.72 for the first brought up during discussion to .25 for the eighteenth.
Is it
Normative or Informational Influence?
When
Stasser and Titus (1985) originally designed the hidden profile study, they
believed that their results would distinguish between the information influence
explanation for social influence provided by persuasive arguments theory and
the normative influence account given by social comparison theory. If group members maintained their
original preference for the weaker candidate, then normative influence
processes would appear to be operating.
If, instead, group members switched their allegiance to the stronger
candidate, then information influence would seem to be at work. They found that group members continued
to support the weaker candidate, and this finding has been replicated numerous
times by many different researchers.
This makes it appear as if normative influence is the fuel behind what
occurs when groups face hidden profiles.
But
is this always true? Could
informational influence also have a role in these situations? Next, we will study different points of
view on this question.
The
common knowledge effect.
The common knowledge effect is the idea that the more people who are
aware of a piece of information, the greater impact that piece of information
has on group membersÕ opinions. Gigone
and Hastie (1993) demonstrated the common knowledge effect by applying a twist
to the usual hidden profile research paradigm. Members of three-person groups were provided with six
different types of numerical information about 32 students, such as their high
school grade point average and their self-reported enjoyment for a particular
course, and asked to predict the studentÕs grade in that course. Of these six items, two were shared by
all three group members, two were shared by two members, and two were
unshared. Gigone and Hastie showed
that, for four of the types of information, the extent to which a particular
information item was shared was related to how strongly the group members
weighed that item in their predictions.
In addition, some types of information, such as high school g.p.a, were
always more influential than others.
This finding is inconsistent
with the assumption behind the information sampling model that all items of
information are equally important.
This does not, however, mean that Gigone and Hastie believe that
normative influence is not important in hidden profile tasks; quite the
opposite. They were also able to
show that the number of items of information discussed by group members was generally
not related to the manner in which the information that the group members were
provided impacted on their predicted grade. In contrast, prediscussion preferences were usually related
to the impact of provided information on predicted grades. This is evidence in favor of normative
influence and against informational influence as responsible for their
findings.
The dual
process model. It
did not take long for researchers to respond to Gigone and HastieÕs work. Winquist and Larson (1998) did some
reasoning that led to an alternative hypothesis. A normative influence account for social influence during
the discussion of hidden profile tasks implies that group membersÕ preferences
after their discussion and their group decision will be totally consistent with
their opinions before the discussion.
Keep in mind that shared information will be consistent with those
prediscussion opinions and unshared information will be inconsistent with
them. If so, then when shared
information comes up during discussion, because unshared information is
consistent with the group membersÕ opinions, it should have no effect on
them. However, when unshared
information is mentioned, it will be inconsistent with those opinions. It follows that if unshared information
has any impact at all on group member preferences and their eventual decisions,
it must be because they provided informational influence contrary to their
original opinions.
The
researchers set up a situation in which each person in three-member groups
received six positive and two negative pieces of information about two job
candidates, implying for each member individually that neither was better than
the other. However, this
information was distributed among the members such that, if successfully pooled
across members, one candidate would clearly stand out over the other. Results showed that decision accuracy
was directly related with the amount of unshared information discussed by the
group but not with the amount of shared information. This is unquestionable support for the presence of
informational influence.
In
response to these findings, Winquist and Larson (1998) proposed a dual-process
model for social influence within groups.
In summary, items of information impact in postdiscussion individual
preferences and group decisions through two avenues. Shared information determines group membersÕ prediscussion
preferences, which in turn, affect their postdiscussion opinions and group
decisions. Unshared information,
in contrast, affects discussion content; this turn impacts on member postdiscussion
preferences and group decisions. These
two influence routes actually occur sequentially, as shared information has
impact before and unshared information has impact during discussion. They will, however, have different
strengths in different situations.
Hidden agenda situations are set up so that group members will agree
with one another; when that occurs, shared information will overwhelm unshared
information and normative influence will be stronger than informational
influence. In circumstances in
which members are less likely to disagree with one another, normative influence
will be lessened, so the effect of unshared information and informational
influence will be stronger.
The Winquist and Larson (1998) dual-process
model seems to ignore the impact that shared information may have in
strengthening membersÕ opinions when the group is in agreement. For this reason, it differs from ours,
which allows for normative influence occurring not only before but at the same
time as informational influence. Having
said this, other research exists that provides more evidence that when groups
disagree with one another about the best choice in a hidden profile situation,
informational influence is important.
For example, the Winquist and Larson study is just one of several that
demonstrated that the extent to which a group discussed the better option was
related to how often the group chose that option. Keep in mind that the better option is usually dispreferred
by group members before discussion, so this discussion almost certainly led to
informational influence. One of
these demonstrations was by Hollingshead (1996), who performed a detailed
analysis of the relationship between prediscussion preferences and group
decisions in a hidden profile task.
She uncovered successful minority influence in 10 of 39 three-member
groups in which only one of the members preferred the best option. As we mentioned earlier in the chapter,
minority influence has largely been viewed as a function of informational
influence; after all, the very concept of normative influence seems
inconsistent with a minorityÕs preferences.
Conclusion
After looking at all the
evidence, it is impossible not to conclude that both informational and
normative influence work together in groups. Although we have presented them as in some sense opposed to
one another, they can also be seen as working in tandem. If a group member makes a particular
argument that other group members have not heard before, informational
influence might occur. At the same
time, group members may see which side of the issue that member is on, and if
it is consistent with the majority, some normative influence might happen
simultaneously. On the other hand,
as we have seen, arguments themselves are seen as more convincing the more
people that voice them.
Another source of evidence
pointing to a dual process is the perceptions of research participants
themselves. In a group polarization
study, Butler and Crano (1992) asked participants who had shifted their
preferences the reasons that they believed to lead to their shift. Of 130 supplied reasons, the authors
categorized 99 as consistent with informational influence (e.g., ÒThe group
gave me new insights that I had not considered,Ó ÒThey brought up new ideas
that I hadnÕt thought ofÓ) and 25 with normative influence (ÒI realized that my
decisions were far from the norm,Ó ÒIt helped to make decisions that would suit
everyoneÓ); the remaining six were irrelevant to both mechanisms. Recently, in an explicit evaluation of
the issue, Price, Nir, and Cappella (2006) determined that both arguments
(information influence) and statements of support for given options (normative
influence) had discernible impacts on opinions after political discussions by
groups discussing the issues on-line.
FROM
THEORY INTO PRACTICE
Scientists
have seen the tendency for groups both to polarize and to be fooled by hidden
profiles as indications of poor decision making, and have looked for ways to
overcome them. Both can be viewed
as the product of a Òtyranny of the majority.Ó This is because they are the result of either individual
opinions or discussion arguments on one side of the issue crowding out those supporting
the other side. Fortunately, those
studying hidden profiles in particular have come up with a number of methods
that have led groups to overcome the domination of shared arguments and attend as
much to the unshared. I suspect
these techniques would also be helpful in lessening group polarization and in paying
more attention to minority points of view in all situations.
First,
members with higher status in groups bring up more unshared information than
those with lower status. For
example, Larson, Christensen, Franz, and Abbott (1998) provided three-member
medical teams with information about a medical case and asked them to make a
decision. The lead physicians in
the medical teams were more likely to add their unshared information to the mix
than the other team members. This
is probably because they have more confidence than the others and feel that
they can deviate from group norms without losing their groupÕs respect. This implies that one way to make group
members comfortable with bringing up all of the information that they have is
to give them status. This can be
done in various ways. For example,
assigning each group member to the job of group expert for a specific part of
the information the group needs to make its decision should help. Fraidin (2004) did just that, and it
motivated the group members to bring up more of their information than those
without such instructions. Along
the same lines, Stasser, Stewart and Wittenbaum (1995) discovered that even
just informing everyone in the group about what unshared information that each
candidate each led to more unshared information coming up.
The
experience of working on a problem may result in group members being more
willing to divulge the information they have the next time they work on the
same type of problem. Wittenbaum
(1998) provided some participants with individual problem-solving experience. She then assigned them to a group that also
included members without that experience and gave that group a similar
problem. As usual, the
inexperienced members mostly brought up shared information. The experienced members, in contrast, brought
up as much unshared information as shared. As all group members knew which among them had the previous
experience, Wittenbaum believed that they were accorded greater status in their
groups, leading to greater comfort at providing unshared information. Another possible explanation for the
findings is that the very experience of doing the task twice led those members
have increased self-confidence.
One
final method for improving group problem-solving discussion is to change the
usual instructions that the group members are given. Groups are usually asked to decide on the best candidate. Stasser and Stewart (1992) gave that description
to half of their groups; as is normal, only about one-third of them made the
correct choice. In contrast, Stasser
and Stewart instructed the other half of the groups to decide which of the
candidates is most likely to be the best candidate. This slight change in wording led to almost 2/3 of the groups
with those instructions overcoming their hidden profile and came to the right
decision. Other instructions that
have proved beneficial are instructions to rank order all of the candidates (Hollingshead,
1996) and to critically evaluate the provided information (Postmes, Spears,
& Cihangir, 2001).
SUMMARY
Chapter
6 described how scientists have generally studied conformity by using
experiments that artificially limit social interaction. This chapter looked at studies that
allowed interaction to proceed more naturally. These studies have led to further insights into social
influence processes. We have
learned that group member opinions tend to converge toward one another, with
minority viewpoints in particular moving closer to those of the majority.
An
insight that we have gained from more natural experiments involves what happens
when group members work on a choice dilemma which pits a more attractive but
risky option against a sure but less attractive alternative. Scientists have found a group
polarization effect. This takes
place when group members are initially in general but not exact agreement on
one side of an issue involving potential risk. In this situation, the groupÕs final decision tends to be on
the same side as their initial judgments, but it is more extreme.
Some
scientists have felt that group polarization occurs because of normative
influence. This consists of group
members coming to change their minds to be consistent with the group majority
just because they believe that the majority must have the correct opinions. Social comparison theory is consistent
with a normative influence explanation for group polarization. We discussed this theory back in
Chapter 6 as an account for conformity.
Here, group members are seen as deciding that the group majorityÕs
preference must be correct and then changing their own views to be more
consistent with it.
Other
scientists have proposed that group polarization is a result of informational
influence. In this case, group
members are seen as changing their minds because of the information that has
come up during group discussion.
Persuasive arguments theory is consistent with the idea of informational
influence. This theory claims that
when group members hear arguments that are consistent with their own
prediscussion views but that they had not thought of earlier, they further
polarize their opinions.
Research
suggests that social comparison theory and persuasive arguments theory may be
partial and complementary explanations for group polarization. Accordingly, I have proposed a model
that attempts to combine these two theories.
The
hidden profile paradigm began as an attempt to distinguish normative and
informational influence explanations for social influence during group
discussion. A hidden profile
exists if the information each group member is individually aware of supports
one decision option, but all the information the group has as a whole implies a
different option. If a group is
susceptible to the hidden profile and decides on the option that each member
believed correct before group discussion, then any influence that occurred would
be consistent with these prediscussion beliefs. This would count as normative influence. In contrast, if group members overcome
the hidden profile, change their minds about the best option, and make the
correct decision, then influence must have come from the information about the
decision that came up during discussion.
Research has shown that most
groups are fooled by the hidden profile.
It has also revealed that group discussion mostly contains mention of the
items of information that all group members share. These findings are consistent with a normative influence
account. The information sampling
model provides a framework for understanding why shared information dominates,
along with other phenomena that occur when groups are faced with hidden profile
tasks. One of these is the
tendency for shared information to come out at the beginning of group
discussions, but for unshared to gain more prominence as discussion continues.
The common knowledge effect is
the tendency for items of information to have more impact on group decisions as
the number of group members that are aware of them increases. Further, some research shows that
prediscussion preferences are related to how much the information that group members
are provided affects group decisions, but the discussion of this information is
not. These results are consistent
with a normative influence explanation.
However, other studies reveal that when group members overcome hidden
profiles, it is due to unshared items of information arising in
discussion. This finding implies
informational influence. As with
group polarization, it is clear that when groups grapple with hidden profile
problems, both types of influence are involved.